institution. Statistical analysis uncovers similar patterns around the world. Martinez-

Peria and Schmukler (1998), find that deposits at banks in Argentina, Chile and Mexico

respond negatively to risk measures generated from accounting data. They also show that

in Chile, where deposit insurance appeared most credible, uninsured depositors were

effective monitors of bank risk.

Examining a sample of New York City banks in the 1920s and 1930s, Calomiris

and Wilson (1998) show that depositors successfully discriminated among banks on the

basis of their riskiness and tended to shift funds to safer havens. Similarly, Kane (1987)

reports that when the Ohio Deposit Guarantee Fund (ODGF) fell into crisis in 1985, Ohio

depositors removed funds only from ODGF-insured institutions. Park (1995) and Park

and Peristiani (1998) show that, during the 1980s, deposit growth at individual U.S.

thrifts was negatively related to their estimated probability of default, so that riskier

thrifts experienced smaller deposit growth.

Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (DKH, 2000) build a bank-level dataset covering

43 countries over 1990-1997, and study both dimensions of depositor discipline by

looking at interest rates and deposit growth. The evidence shows that explicit insurance

lowers banks’ interest expenses and makes interest payments less sensitive to bank risk

and liquidity. However, regardless of the character of a country’s safety net, some

market discipline survives. Consistent with the U.S. evidence on interest sensitivity, the

market discipline DKH can observe responds to gaps in coverage, weaknesses in the

credibility of the guarantees, and delays and other costs entailed in recovering funds from

the guarantor.

DKH particularly focus on how variation in design characteristics affect market

discipline. They find that market discipline is stronger in countries with higher levels of

institutional development. Nevertheless, even in countries whose institutional

development is strong, badly designed deposit insurance curtails market discipline.

Setting higher coverage limits, extending coverage to interbank deposits, establishing an

ex-ante fund of reserves, funding reserves from government sources, and insisting on

public management each displaces market discipline. On the other hand, market

discipline is enhanced by coinsurance provisions, covering foreign currency deposits, and

establishing private or joint management of the insurance enterprise.

The value deposit insurance offers banks and their creditors can be measured by

the reduction it creates in required interest rates. Society pays for increases in the

上一页  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 下一页